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Abstract 
This article examines attitudes about terrorism utilizing criminological literature 
about fear of crime and perceived risk of victimization and data from a statewide 
survey of 1,617 adults in Kentucky. Measures of both fear of terrorism and perceived 
risk of terrorism were geography based. The demographic variables had minimal 
impact on both perceived risk of terrorism and fear of terrorism, although gender was 
significantly related to both, suggesting a link based on socialization experiences of 
men and women.  Although rural residence had a small but statistically significant 
relationship to perceived risk, it was not related to fear.  The strongest predictor of 
fear was perceived risk itself, which mirrors research on the close association of fear 
of crime and perceived risk to victimization. 
Keywords:  Terrorism, Fear of Crime, Perceived Risk 
 
*Data used in this study were collected as part of a victimization survey funded by the Kentucky 
Statistical Analysis Center in March, 2008.  Any opinions expressed in this study are those of the 
authors and not of the Kentucky Justice Cabinet or the Kentucky Statistical Analysis Center. 
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Introduction 
 On September 11, 2001, 2,752 people lost their life in the attacks on the World 
Trade Center in New York (Hirschkorn 2007).  That single event (perhaps more than 
any individual event since the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941) reshaped the 
mindset of both American citizens and American legislators.  This terroristic event 
triggered a war on two fronts (Afghanistan and eventually Iraq), created a number of 
legislative acts and security procedures that reshaped public behavior throughout the 
United States, and, arguably, introduced a realization for many Americans that they 
were not as safe in their daily lives in the United States as they thought they were 
prior to 9/11.  Nevertheless, despite these widespread changes, and despite anecdotal 
evidence that suggests Americans are more fearful of terrorism after 9/11 than they 
were prior to its occurrence, little scientific literature of which we are aware examines 
either the prevalence of fear of terrorism or the perceived likelihood of victimization 
by terrorism. Furthermore, practically none examines those perceptions among rural 
Americans. 
In this article, we attempt to fill that gap in the literature by using data from over 
1,600 adult Kentuckians to examine both their perceived risk of terrorism 
victimization and their fear of terrorism.  By doing so, we hope to determine if (a) 
terrorism risk and fear of victimization are more pervasive than risk and fear of 
victimization by other types of crime; and (b) if the predictors of elevated perceptions 
of risk and fear of terrorism match those that we know predict perceived risk and fear 
of crime for other types of crime.  By doing so, we hope to provide some 
understanding regarding the fear and risk of terrorism in rural communities. 
Definition of Terrorism 
The United States Federal Code defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents” (United States Federal Code, 2009, Title 22, Chapter 38, Para. 
2656, section f2).  However, this is only one of hundreds of definitions of terrorism; 
as such, despite the fact that most scholars agree that terrorism exists, not many can 
agree on the definition of terrorism.  Kushner (2003) states that most definitions of 
terrorism hinge on one of three factors:  the purpose, the target, and the method.  In 
other words, most definitions of terrorism suggest that, in some form, terrorism is an 
act designed to instill fear through some form of violence that is politically motivated 
(Kushner 2003). 
Terrorism can be domestic or international.  Domestic terrorism is the act of 
violence primarily within the United States while international terrorism refers to the 
activities that involve violent acts that would be considered criminal if committed 
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within the jurisdiction of the United States (National Victim Assistance Academy 
2002).  Given these components of the definition, terrorism is not only physical 
violence, but emotional violence as well.  Because there is no single definition of 
terrorism, each person or country can hold its own definitions based on their political 
or religious orientation. 
 Terror is a device to control society by means of preventive intimidation under 
conditions of mass hysteria (Vasilenko 2004).  In fact, Vasilenko (2004: 46) argues 
that the word “terror” is of Latin origin and can be translated to mean “fear” or 
“horror.”  Although terrorism is considered to be one of the most significant social 
problems confronting the world community in the 21st century (Vasilenko 2004), 
some scholars suggest that before 9/11, there was no nationwide fear of terrorism in 
the United States (Victor 2006). 
 In recent years, the United States has been subject to a number of terrorist attacks, 
including the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; attacks on the USS 
Cole in 2000; and the aforementioned devastating attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 brought about a dramatic change.  Victor (2006) 
reported that in a Gallup Poll conducted in August, 2004, those surveyed were asked 
if they believed, “terrorists would target an attack against New York City and other 
big cities, or any place in the U.S."  The majority of respondents (61 percent) stated 
they felt an attack could occur in any area of the United States while 31 percent 
reported that an attack could occur in New York City or bigger cities.  In the same 
article, a national Gallup poll found that 41 percent of Americans said they were very 
worried or somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would become a 
victim of terrorism. 
 Since September 11, 2001, the media coverage of terrorist threats and terrorist 
groups has increased dramatically.  DiMaggio (2008) claims that citizen fears are 
often driven by media framing of issues; when the media has a vested interest in an 
issue (e.g., terrorism), the reporting of that issue often becomes slanted so that the 
factual information is reported through a lens of fear and anxiety.  Thus, the constant 
media attention to terrorism, its causes, and its consequences may undermine the 
larger social order by impacting psychological processes of citizens in the countries 
where terrorism is reported as a threat (Fisher, Greitemeyer, Kastenmuller, Frey, & 
Oßwald 2007). 
 Fear is a powerful response to terrorism that may be distorted through media 
images and messages (Borgeson & Valeri 2009).  Compared to 20 or 30 years ago, 
advances in technology today are a leading contributor to the distribution of 
information to the public, and therefore, those distorted images.  Local and national 
news media utilize the television, radio, and Internet as broadcasting tools to convey 
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information to citizens in our fast-paced society.  The language used by these media 
appears to be particularly troubling for certain demographic groups, as it has been 
shown to evoke fear in elderly citizens who live in rural areas at greater levels than 
those who live in larger cities, making older persons in rural localities more fearful of 
violent events and terrorist attacks than older persons in bigger places (Victor 2006). 
 As with other dramatic events, the media also exaggerates terrorism, in turn 
creating the potential to inflate the public’s fear of terrorism and perceived risk of 
future attacks (Borgeson & Valeri 2009).  The authors go even further to 
acknowledge that the media’s treatment of crime is much like that of its treatment of 
terrorism.  In addition, they point to the fact that viewers reporting their main source 
of information as local news are more fearful of crime than those that report the 
national news as their main source of information.  As such, fear of terrorism can be a 
by-product used by terrorist groups in an effort to disrupt society. 
 Josiger (2009) stated that “terrorism is a form of psychological warfare designed 
to maximize publicity and influence audiences significantly larger than the immediate 
victims (p. 4).”  Josiger argues that the aim of terrorist attacks is to intimidate the 
targeted population and suggests that terrorists anticipate that the increased level of 
fear and political disaffection will force governments to make compromises that will 
ultimately make their attempts more successful.  Therefore, the perceptions of the 
public are important in simultaneously driving the government’s response to 
terrorism.  In considering public perceptions in relation to counter-terrorism policies, 
the targeted governments that are unable of responding to terrorist acts will lose the 
support of the public; likewise, a government that reacts outrageously or restricts the 
public will be criticized. 
 Empirical evidence so far suggests that, despite the fact that several years have 
passed since 9/11, public fear of terrorism is still elevated (Nellis 2007).  Some 
authors suggest that the public overestimates the threat of terrorist attacks (Friedman 
2005) and that perceived risks are out of sync with reality.   In fact, some authors 
suggest that American citizens have overestimated the threat of terrorist attacks given 
the decline of such attacks after September 11, 2001 (Friedman 2005) and argue that 
Americans are more likely to be struck by lightning or die in a car accident than to die 
in a terrorist attack. 
 Despite the evidence that suggests that terrorism negatively impacts the psyche of 
citizens in countries where terrorist attacks occur, and given that one of the goals of 
terrorist actions is to increase fear and concern about future terrorist activity, 
relatively few studies have examined fear of terrorism and its correlates.  Those that 
do are discussed in detail below. 
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Fear of Terrorism 
 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Boscarino, Figley, and Adams 
(2003) addressed terrorism and the fear of terrorism using data collected from a 
sample of adults in the state of New York in September 2002.  The state was divided 
into five regions: New York City, Long Island, Hudson Valley region, Upstate 
Eastern region, and Upstate Western region.  Respondents were asked about their 
levels of concern (very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, not 
concerned at all) related to the following events happening in New York: (a) another 
major terrorist attack, (b) a terrorist attack involving biological weapons, such as 
smallpox or anthrax, and (c) a terrorist attack involving a “nuclear device” (p. 201). 
 Boscarino et al. (2003) found that almost half (45.7%) of New Yorkers reported 
being “very concerned” about another major attack, 50.4 percent were very concerned 
about biological attacks, and 42.5 percent reported being very concerned about 
nuclear attacks.  Additionally, one in three respondents (33.4%) reported that they 
were very concerned about all three events occurring.  Their multivariate analyses 
determined that women, older respondents, African Americans, Hispanics, and less 
educated respondents were all more fearful of terrorism than their counterparts.  The 
downstate residents also reported higher levels of fear, as 41.7 percent of downstate 
respondents were very concerned about a major attack compared to only 22 percent 
for upstate respondents.  Also, New York City and Long Island residents reported a 
higher level of concern and were more likely to report that they would evacuate 
immediately following another attack.  The authors closed by stating that, overall, 
“there was a significant public concern about future terrorist attacks in New York 
(Boxcarino et al 2003: 203).” 
 Boscarino et al. (2003) made a significant contribution to the research in the area 
of fear of terrorism.  Nevertheless, their research was the exception, not the rule.  The 
other research that examines fear of terrorism is largely descriptive research and most 
of that research is conducted by the Gallup organization.  In one Gallup poll, the 
questioned was posed, “How worried are you that you or someone in your family will 
become a victim of terrorism – very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or 
not worried at all (p. 128)?”  The data collected since 1995 concluded that after the 
Oklahoma City bombing, 42 percent were somewhat or very worried.  Before 
September 11, 2001, only 24 percent were somewhat worried; the day of 9/11, 35 
percent were somewhat worried, while 24 percent were very worried (p. 128). 
 A second Gallup poll found that almost 9 in 10 Americans felt it was likely that 
bombings or similar acts of violence would occur elsewhere in the United States in 
the near future (Carroll 2009).  In another Gallup poll, Carlson (2004) indicated that 
the public’s concern regarding terrorism has declined since the September 11 terror 
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attack; however, immediately following the attacks, more than half of Americans 
expressed concern about being victimized by another act of terrorism.  Women were 
more worried about terrorism than men (38% v 29%) but another variable of interest, 
political affiliation, did not impact one’s fear of terrorism.  Republicans, Democrats, 
and political independents were all equally likely to indicate they were very worried 
or somewhat worried about terrorism. 
 In a telephone interview of randomly selected national sample of 1,031 adults, 
Moore (1999) determined that there was little difference by age, gender, education, or 
partisan political orientation; however, individuals with higher incomes were less 
likely than those with lower incomes to report a fear of terrorist attacks.  Moore found 
that, even before 9/11, 58 percent of respondents with a household income of less 
than $50,000 per year reported they were less likely to attend a large public event on 
New Year’s Day.  Saad (2004) determined that although fear of terrorism has 
declined since the 9/11 events, fear of terrorism remained higher than pre-9/11 levels. 
 In sum, then, available evidence suggests that many Americans are fearful of 
terrorism and that fear of terrorism has detrimental impacts on their daily lives.  
Interestingly, none of the studies reviewed above compared predictors of fear of 
terrorism and perceived risk of terrorism to individuals’ fear and perceived risk of 
victimization of more “traditional” crimes (e.g., robbery, theft, rape).  Consequently, 
this relationship remains unexplored.  In the following section, we provide a short 
summary and review of the available evidence regarding fear of crime, risk of 
criminal victimization, and its predictors.  We then move to the purpose of this study 
and the relationship between fear and perceived risk of terrorism and fear and 
perceived risk of more traditional crimes. 
 Predictors of Fear of Crime 
 Although relatively few studies have explicitly examined fear of terrorism, 
intuitively, predictors of fear of terrorism should be similar to predictors of fear of 
other crimes as well.  In the following pages, we review the available evidence 
regarding predictors of fear of crime and close by offering hypotheses (based on this 
literature) regarding how these demographic predictors should impact fear of 
terrorism. 
 There are a number of demographic factors that have demonstrated an association 
with fear of criminal victimization, including gender, age, race, income status, 
victimization status, and environmental context.  For example, gender is a strong 
predictor of fear of crime, with women expressing more fear of crime than men even 
though they are less likely to be victimized by crime in general than males.  This 
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discrepancy between fear levels and actual victimization rates is often called the 
“gender-fear paradox.” 
 Several explanations are posed for this paradox, including suggestions that (1) 
women feel physically vulnerable because of their generally smaller physical stature 
than males; (2) women’s fear of rape and violence from their spouses / partners / 
boyfriends “shadows” their fear of all other crimes (in other words, women associate 
rape with burglary, robbery and all other personal crimes, thus increasing their fear of 
those crimes because they fear they may be raped during that victimization 
experience, and (3) women's fear of crime and men’s lack of fear of crime is part of 
the gender socialization process (Ferarro 1995; Ferraro 1996; Fisher & Sloan 2003; 
Gilchrist et al. 1998; Goodey 1997; Haynie 1998; Killias & Clerici 2000; May 2001a; 
May 2001b; Smith & Torstensson 1997; Stanko 1990). 
 The available research also suggests that age has an important influence on fear, 
as older people are often found to fear crime at higher levels than younger people, 
although some question the age-fear association (LaGrange and Ferraro 1989; Warr, 
1990).  In terms of income and race, research suggests that low income individuals 
are more likely to report fear of crime than middle to upper income individuals.  
Although this finding is intriguing, little work has considered this variable in much 
detail (Hale 1996; Vacha and McLaughlin 2004).  The connection between a person’s 
race and fear of crime is also inconsistent, with some studies finding white 
individuals with higher fear of crime levels, and other studies finding non-white 
individuals with higher fear of crime levels (Lane & Meeker, 2003; May & Dunaway 
2000; Parker, McMorris, Smith, & Murty 1993).  This issue is further complicated by 
the fact that the racial composition of the neighborhood in which individuals reside 
may be more influential than the individual’s race in determining fear of crime level 
(Hale 1996). 
 Since September 11, 2001, the media coverage of terrorist threats and terrorist 
groups has increased dramatically and researchers have studied the impact of media 
exposure on terrorism fear and perceptions (Nellis 2007; Nellis 2009; Lane, Meeker, 
& Nellis 2009).  DiMaggio (2008) claims that citizen fears are often driven by media 
framing of issues; when the media has a vested interest in an issue (e.g., terrorism), 
the reporting of that issue often becomes slanted so that the factual information is 
reported through a lens of fear and anxiety.  Thus, the constant media attention to 
terrorism, its causes, and its consequences may undermine the larger social order by 
impacting psychological processes of citizens in the countries where terrorism is 
reported as a threat (Fisher, Greitemeyer, Kastenmuller, Frey, & Oßwald 2007) and 
may inflate the public’s fear of terrorism and perceived risk of future attacks (Nellis 
2009). 
      Predictors of Fear and Risk of Terrorism in a Rural State – May, Herbert, Cline and Nellis  
8 | P a g e  
 
 Demographic predictors of crime fear can serve as a template for exploring 
correlates of terrorism fear and perceived risk. Extant research findings suggest that 
females, older persons, nonwhites, and those with a lower household income are more 
fearful of criminal victimization. As such, we expect that they will be more fearful of 
terrorism as well.  Although not reviewed here, the literature suggests that these 
variables should also impact risk of terrorism in much the same way.  In the following 
pages we explore whether those predictors of fear and risk of criminal victimization 
in general apply to fear and risk of terrorism as well. 
 Predictors of Perceived Risk of Victimization 
 Ferraro (1995) was one of the first fear of crime researchers to distinguish fear of 
criminal victimization from risk of criminal victimization.  Ferraro (1995) argued that 
perceived risk of victimization differed from fear of crime because perceived risk 
involved a cognitive judgment while fear of crime represented an emotional response.  
Since that time, most fear of crime researchers now view perceived risk as a cognitive 
assessment of their actual risk of criminal victimization that is usually the best 
predictor of fear of criminal victimization.  A number of researchers now argue that 
both risk and fear should be considered in any attempt to understand fear of crime 
(see Rader, May, and Goodrum 2007, for review). 
 Several studies have considered the demographic predictors of perceived risk.  
The relationship between demographic variables and perceived risk does not appear 
to be as clear as demographic predictors of fear of crime. Although relatively few 
studies have considered demographic predictors of risk, among those that have, a 
number find that perceptions of risk is crime-specific and that the relationship 
between gender, perceived risk, and fear of crime is gender-specific; men have higher 
levels of perceived risk for robbery than women but women's perceptions of risk 
impacted fear of sexual assault and burglary (Rader et al. 2007).  Relationships 
between age, income, race, and perceptions of risk of victimization have similar 
complexities.  As such, while there appear to be fairly clear relationships between 
gender, race, age, income, education, and fear of crime, the relationship between 
these variables and perceptions of risk of criminal victimization are more complex.  
As such, more research is needed to clarify these relationships. 
Methods 
 Sampling 
 The data used in this study were derived from a victimization survey of adults in 
Kentucky conducted in the spring of 2008.  In order for the survey to be 
representative of the state, our initial request was to the Kentucky Division of Motor 
Vehicle Licensing to obtain a randomly selected list of 5,000 licensed drivers to use 
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as the sampling frame for this analysis.  In early February, we learned that current 
technological limitations did not make that a feasible sampling strategy.  We then 
approached the Kentucky State Board of Elections and requested a list of all 
registered voters in the state of Kentucky.  Upon receipt of this list, we selected a 
random sample of 5,000 registered voters. 
Data Collection: In March, 2008, we mailed a postcard to the 5,000 addresses 
that we had randomly selected advising them that they would be receiving a mail 
questionnaire asking them to share their experience with crime and victimization.  
Approximately two weeks later, we mailed a packet containing the questionnaire, a 
cover letter explaining the purpose of the project, and a metered return envelope to 
each of the 5,000 selected addresses.  Approximately two weeks later, we mailed a 
reminder postcard to all respondents that had not returned a completed questionnaire 
(or for whom we had not been notified by the post office that their address was 
incorrect).  Two weeks after that, we mailed another packet containing the same 
contents as the initial packet.  The data collection began in late March and continued 
into late May, 2008. 
 One in eight (11.9%) of the addresses selected were undeliverable to the 
respondent drawn through the random sampling strategy described above.  Although 
we were notified by survivors that five respondents originally selected were deceased, 
practically all of the 593 respondents for whom the survey was undeliverable were 
not able to be contacted because the address supplied by the voter registration 
database was incorrect.  Additionally, 15 respondents informed us by sending a letter 
or the questionnaire that we sent to them that they did not want to participate in the 
study.  Three additional respondents returned a questionnaire that contained only 
minimal information (e.g., their gender and one or two other completed questions).  
Completed, usable questionnaires were received from 1,617 respondents.  Using a 
total sample of 4,407 respondents as the valid sample from which the respondents 
were drawn, the response rate for this study was thus 36.7 percent.  
 Survey Instrument:  Members of the Statistical Analysis Committee met with a 
Justice Cabinet representative in December, 2007 to begin the development of a 
survey draft and to establish the data collection technique and the sampling strategy 
to be used in this effort.   Following this meeting, a draft of the survey was presented 
to the Statistical Analysis Coordinator for the state of Kentucky, who then sought 
input from a number of constituencies in January and February, 2008.  Feedback from 
these groups was used to revise the survey. The final version of the survey was 
completed in March, 2008. 
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Table 1  Comparison of Sample and Population Demographic Characteristics* 
 
Demographic Variable Sample  
Frequency (Percent) 
2000 Census Estimates 
Frequency (Percent) 
Gender   
Male 730 (45.1) 1,975,368 (48.9) 
Female 884 (54.7) 2,066,401 (51.1) 
Missing Data 3 (0.2) -- 
Race   
White 1524 (94.2) 3,678,740 (91.0) 
Black 58 (3.6) 311,000 (7.7) 
Other  38 (2.3) 96,581 (2.4) 
Missing Data 7 (0.4) -- 
Education   
Less than 12 years 119 (7.3) 685,000 (25.9) 
G.E.D./High School Graduate 596 (36.9) 888,277 (33.6) 
Some College 300 (18.6) 619,651 (23.4) 
College Graduate 406 (25.1) 271,418 (10.3) 
Postgraduate Work 152 (9.3) 182,051 (6.9) 
Missing Data 44 (2.7) -- 
Age N (%)  
18-24 83 (5.1) 401,858 (13.4) 
25-35 192 (12.1) 632,494 (21.0) 
36-45 264 (16.4) 637,074 (21.2) 
46-55 355 (22.0) 539,033.2 (17.9) 
56-65 369 (23.0) 361,716.4 (12.0) 
66 and over 335 (20.0) 432,219.4 (14.4) 
Missing Data 14 (0.9) -- 
Marital Status   
Married 1059 (65.5) 1,844,628 (57.3) 
Widowed 103 (6.4) 231,630 (7.2) 
Divorced 165 (10.2) 353,637 (11.0) 
Single, Never Married 208 (12.9) 730,035 (22.7) 
Opposite Sex partner sharing a home 60 (3.7) -- 
Same Sex partner sharing a home 5 (0.3) -- 
Missing Data 17 (1.1) -- 
Number of  children <18 living at current 
residence 
  
0 1047 (64.7) -- 
1-2 426 (26.4) -- 
3 or more 78 (4.9) -- 
Missing Data 66 (4.1) -- 
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 Table 1 continued:  Comparison of Sample and Population Demographic Characteristics*  
 
Demographic Variable Sample  
(Frequency & Percent) 
2000 Census Estimates 
(Frequency & Percent) 
Income   
Less than $20,000 258 (16.0) 477,186 (30.0) 
$20,000 to less than $50,000 446 (27.6) 604,145 (38.0) 
$50,000 to less than $80,000 370 (22.9) 274,530 (17.2)a 
$80,000 or more 340 (22.3) 235,878 (14.8) 
Missing Data 183 (11.3) -- 
Place of Residence   
Urban (Louisville or Lexington) 390 (24.1) 954,116 (23.6) 
Rural (Rest of State) 1222 (75.6) 3,087,653 (76.4) 
Missing Data 5 (.3)  
 
aCensus data are categorized from $50,000-$75,000 and  over $75,000, rather than $50,000-$80,000 and over 
$80,000, as the question measuring household income was worded on the survey instrument for this study. 
*
 Due to the differences in the manner in which some of the demographic data were categorized, some  
 of the categorical data were interpolated. 
 
 The demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 1 
alongside the state’s applicable demographic characteristics, according to the 2000 
census.  A comparison of the results indicates that respondents in this study were 
slightly more likely to be female, white, older, married, and have higher  
levels of income and education than the Census figures indicated for the state of 
Kentucky.  Most of these differences are likely due to the fact that the sample utilized 
in this study was adults who had registered to vote (rather than a more representative 
sample like the one that we would have drawn had we had access to the motor vehicle 
registration database).  As such, the results presented here are not truly representative of 
the population of Kentucky adults.  Consequently, given the fact that crime victims are 
disproportionately male, nonwhite, unmarried, less educated, and with lower household 
incomes, the results presented here provide at best a conservative estimate of 
victimization experiences with crime in Kentucky. 
Dependent Variables 
 Perceived risk of victimization by terrorist activity: Two items were used to 
create an index to represent risk of victimization by terrorism (the Risk of Terrorism 
index).  Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood (on a scale of 1 to 10) of 
the following statements:  (1) There will be a terrorist attack in Kentucky during the 
next 12 months; and (2) There will be a terrorist attack in my community in the next 
      Predictors of Fear and Risk of Terrorism in a Rural State – May, Herbert, Cline and Nellis  
12 | P a g e  
 
12 months.  Responses were summed so that the risk of terrorism scale scores ranged 
from 2 to 20 (Mean = 5.50, s.d. = 4.09).  Cronbach’s alpha for the index was .830. 
 Fear of terrorism: The index representing fear of terrorism (fear of terrorism 
index) was created by asking respondents to indicate their level of agreement 
(1=Strongly disagree; 2=Somewhat disagree; 3=Somewhat agree; 4=Strongly agree) 
with four statements.  These statements were as follows:  (1) I am afraid I will be a 
victim in a terrorist attack (26% agreed); (2) I am afraid someone in my family will 
be a victim in a terrorist attack (37% agreed); (3) I am afraid someone in my 
community will be a victim in a terrorist attack (38% agreed); and (4) I am afraid 
someone in Kentucky will be a victim in a terrorist attack (58.8% agreed).  Scores on 
the index ranged from 4 to 16  (Mean=8.99; s.d.=3.09).  Cronbach’s alpha for the 
index was .887. 
Table 2  Descriptive Statistics for Fear and Risk of Terrorism Variables  
 
Variable 
Strongly 
Agree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
N (%) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
N (%) 
I am afraid I will be a victim in a terrorist 
attack 
 
66 (4.0) 
 
336 (20.6) 
 
639 (39.1) 
 
526 (32.2) 
I am afraid someone in my family will be a 
victim in a terrorist attack 
 
132 (8.1) 
 
443 (27.1) 
 
579 (35.4) 
 
413 (25.3) 
I am afraid someone in my community will 
be a victim in a terrorist attack 
 
110 (6.7) 
 
480 (29.4) 
 
588 (36.0) 
 
388 (23.7) 
I am afraid someone in Kentucky will be a 
victim in a terrorist attack 
 
269 (16.5) 
 
682 (41.7) 
 
398 (24.3) 
 
216 (13.2) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
How likely do you think it is that there will 
be a terrorist attack in my community during 
the next 12 months? 
 
1 
 
10 
 
2.28 
 
 
2.12 
 
How likely do you think it is that there will 
be a terrorist attack in Kentucky during the 
next 12 months? 
 
1 
 
10 
 
3.22 
 
2.30 
 
  
As the results presented in Table 2 indicate, more respondents were fearful that 
their family and their community would be victimized by terrorism than were fearful 
for their own safety from terrorism.  Three in five respondents were fearful that  
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someone would be a victim of terrorism in Kentucky, indicating that a large number 
of respondents fear terrorism in their home state seven years after the terrorist events 
of September 11.  Additionally, based on the average response for the perceived risk 
of terrorism measures, respondents felt relatively little risk of terroristic activity in 
both their community and in Kentucky.  Nevertheless, respondents were more likely 
to perceive that there would be a terrorist action in the state of Kentucky than in their 
own community. 
 
Multivariate Results 
 Because the purpose of this study was to examine the predictors of both fear of 
local terrorism and risk of victimization by terrorists in the local community, 
multivariate linear regression was used to determine what demographic predictors had 
significant associations with both perceived risk of terrorism victimization and fear of 
terrorism. 
 The results of regressing risk of terrorism victimization on the demographic 
variables are presented in Table 3 on the next page.  The results presented in Table 3 
suggest that only age, gender, and place of residence impact perceptions of risk of 
terrorism, as older respondents, female respondents, and those respondents living 
outside of the large urban areas were significantly more likely to perceive that they 
would be victimized by terrorist activity than their younger, male, and urban 
counterparts.  Neither race, whether the respondents had children, marital status, or 
income had an association with risk of terrorism.  Additionally, the variables included 
in the model explained only two percent of the variation in perceived risk among the 
respondents. 
 The results of regressing fear of terrorism on the demographic variables and 
perceptions of risk of terrorism are presented in Table 4 (next page).  The results 
presented in Table 4 suggest that gender, marital status, and perceived risk of 
terrorism all had a significant impact on fear of terrorism, as females, married 
respondents, and those with highest levels of perceived risk of terrorism were all 
significantly more fearful of terrorism than their counterparts with lower levels of risk 
of terrorism and their male and unmarried counterparts.  The variables included in the 
model explained only 16 percent of the variation in perceived risk among the 
respondents. 
Discussion 
 Using data from over 1,600 Kentucky adults, in this study we attempted to 
identify demographic predictors of both perceived risk of terrorism and fear of 
terrorism victimization.  In doing so, we hoped to expand a largely nonexistent 
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Table 3  Multivariate Linear Regression Results of Regressing Perceived Risk   
     of Terrorism on Demographic Variables 
 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 4.660 .691  6.749 .000 
White -.457 .486 -.026 -.941 .347 
Age .017 .008 .067 2.149 .032 
Female .655 .218 .082 2.999 .003 
Respondent has kids .256 .263 .030 .973 .331 
Married .117 .256 .014 .457 .648 
Income .085 .238 .011 .359 .720 
Rural .821 .257 .088 3.192 .001 
   
F= 3.47; p<.001;  R Square = .018;  Df:  1354 
 
Table 4  Multivariate Linear Regression Results of Regressing Fear of Terrorism 
          on Perceived Risk of Terrorism and Demographic Variables 
 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 5.856 .499  11.731 .000 
White .526 .347 .039 1.515 .130 
Age .007 .006 .038 1.333 .183 
Female .424 .156 .069 2.718 .007 
Respondent has kids .012 .187 .002 .067 .947 
Married .597 .183 .092 3.268 .001 
Income .150 .169 .024 .889 .374 
Rural .332 .184 .046 1.804 .071 
Perceived Risk of 
Terrorism .289 .020 .373 14.810 .000 
    
F= 33.49; p<.001;  R Square =  .167;  Df: 1347 
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literature regarding perceptions of risk of terrorism and fear of terrorism 
victimization.  Our findings from that effort are discussed in detail below. 
 First and foremost, the demographic variables included in the model to explain 
perceived risk of terrorism have minimal impact on that variable.  Although 
females, rural respondents, and older respondents were more likely to have elevated 
levels of perceived risk of terrorism, the demographic variables included in the model 
explained only two percent of the variation in perceived risk of terrorism among the 
respondents in this study.  Consequently, it is evident that perceptions of risk of 
terrorism are not explained by demographic variables normally associated with 
perceived risk of other types of crimes.  Thus, perceptions of risk of terrorism must be 
explained by contextual or theoretical factors rather than demographic factors. 
 Given the global nature of the questionnaire used to collect data for this study, we 
were unable to explore in great detail a number of these factors that may impact risk 
of terrorism victimization.  Because the questions included in the risk measure were 
geographic in nature (e.g., risk of terrorism in the respondent’s community and risk of 
terrorism in the state where they lived, Kentucky), demographic characteristics are 
probably not as important in predicting risk of terrorism as characteristics of where 
the respondent lives.  Interestingly, residents of areas outside of Lexington and 
Louisville (the two large metropolitan areas in Kentucky) had higher levels of 
perceived risk of terrorism than their counterparts in those two cities.   This finding 
may be due to the unique nature of Kentucky, as most of the targets considered to be 
at greatest risk of terrorist activity in Kentucky (e.g., Bluegrass Army Depot, Fort 
Campbell, Fort Knox, most of the Interstate system) are in rural areas.  As such, 
respondents living in Louisville and Lexington may be correct in considering 
themselves less at risk of terrorism than their more rural counterparts.  Future 
research efforts exploring perceptions of risk of terrorism should include questions to 
identify whether respondents have a terrorist target in their community to determine if 
this relationship is truly the best explanation of levels of perceived risk of terrorism. 
 A second important finding from this research has to do with the relationship 
between perceived risk of terrorism victimization and fear of terrorism victimizations.  
Although the demographic variables did little to predict either risk or fear of 
terrorism, perceived risk of terrorism was a strong predictor of fear of terrorism; in 
other words, those respondents who considered themselves most at risk of terrorism 
in their community and state were also most likely to fear terrorism victimization in 
their family and community.  This relationship mirrors that found in the research 
regarding fear of more traditional crimes and provides insight into methods to reduce 
fear of terrorism (discussed below). 
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 A third important finding from this research has to do with the impact of gender 
on both perceived risk of terrorism and fear of terrorism.  Women were significantly 
more likely to perceive themselves at risk of terrorism and to fear terrorism as well.  
As such, gender is an important predictor of fear of terrorism, just as it is an important 
predictor of fear of more traditional crimes as well.  This finding is particularly 
interesting because the relationship between gender and fear of crime is often 
attributed to the “shadow of sexual assault” hypothesis that suggests that fear of all 
crime is colored by fear of sexual assault among females (Ferraro 1995; Warr 1984).  
Given that the measures used to estimate fear of crime are geography based rather 
than crime-specific (e.g., afraid of a terrorist activity in my community v. afraid of 
being robbed), the shadow of sexual assault is probably not associated with fear of 
terrorism in the same manner as fear of more traditional crimes. 
 Given this fact, the fact that females are more fearful than males of terrorism 
among their family and in their community, the evidence presented here suggests that 
the best explanation of the gender-fear paradox discussed earlier may be that women's 
fear of crime and men’s lack of fear is part of the gender socialization process.  In 
other words, women are socialized to be more open about their emotions and thus 
women are more likely than men to admit their fears, even on confidential, self-report 
surveys. It may also be that women are reacting to their own reality in which they are 
more likely to be the victims of violence by immediate family members, especially 
their partners. Future research efforts should continue to explore this phenomenon by 
comparing place-based fear with crime-based fear among the same sample of 
respondents.  By doing so, researchers may eventually understand the gender-fear 
paradox in ways that current knowledge does not allow. 
 A final important finding from this research has to do with the extent of fear of 
terrorism victimization among the respondents in this sample.  The findings presented 
here suggest that, if the respondents in this sample are indicative of the larger 
population, concerns about fear of terrorism increase as an individual considers 
terroristic activity outside of the environment they can control.  As the results in 
Table 2 suggest, only one in four respondents agreed that they were afraid they would 
personally be a victim in a terrorist action.  However, one in three was afraid 
someone in their family and or their community would be a victim in a terrorist action 
and almost three in five were afraid someone in Kentucky would be victimized by 
terrorism.  As such, it appears that people may not be as concerned about their 
personal victimization by terrorism as they are about their family, community, and 
state.  Alternatively, it may also be the case that the respondents were making a 
somewhat logical, cognitive judgment in that answer.  Individuals may realize that 
they personally have little chance of terrorism victimization and thus have lower 
levels of fear of terrorism when asked about their own victimization but realize that, 
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as the size of the population at risk increases, the likelihood of terrorism victimization 
increases as well.  Thus, the respondent may realize their chance of personal 
victimization is less than that of their family, community, and state populations based 
on the sheer increase in numbers in those populations.  Future research efforts should 
build on this finding by including more specific measures of fear and risk of terrorism 
victimization with these somewhat general measures to attempt to better understand 
these findings. 
Conclusion 
 While we feel this study has made a number of substantive contributions to the 
area of fear and perceptions of risk of terrorism victimization, we are aware that there 
are a number of limitations that reduce its generalizability. As mentioned earlier, the 
first limitation has to do with the sampling frame of this report.  Our initial plan was 
to obtain 5,000 addresses from the Kentucky Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing.  
Nevertheless, current system limitations would not allow us to draw a sample of that 
size that was representative of drivers throughout the state.  Because that sample was 
not available, we then had to use the next most representative set of addresses that we 
could find:   voter registration records.  Because voters rarely update their registration 
records when they move across town, however, use of these records uncovered almost 
600 (593) addresses at which the survey was undeliverable.  This further limited the 
potential number of respondents as well. 
 Additionally, because we were only able to use a sample of registered voters, that 
sampling strategy necessarily excludes one group of adults:  unregistered voters.  A 
number of researchers have determined that residents who are young, mobile, less 
educated, and of lower socioeconomic status are less likely to both register to vote 
and vote than their counterparts (see Knack, & White 2000, for review).  
Additionally, in Kentucky, registered voters are more likely to be female (53% of 
registered voters) and Democrat (57% of registered voters-- see Kentucky State 
Board of Election statistics available at http://www.elect.ky.gov/stats/).  As such, a 
random sample of registered voters in Kentucky is likely to be slightly older, less 
mobile, more educated, of higher socioeconomic status, slightly more female, and 
more likely to be Democrats.  The demographic statistics presented in Table 1 suggest 
that these characteristics are evident in this sample as well. 
 Another limitation has to do with the type of measures used in this study.  As we 
pointed out previously, to fully understand fear and risk of terrorism victimization 
and its causes and consequences, a number of measures specifically examining those 
phenomena need to be included.  Given the global nature of the survey from which 
we drew our data, we were not able to go to the level of detail necessary to fully 
understand these relationships. 
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 Nevertheless, within the limitations of this sample, we feel that the findings 
presented here are informational and relevant and should be considered by those 
working in any function that deals with terrorism and its consequences.  The research 
presented here suggests that there are important steps policymakers and professionals 
working in law enforcement and homeland security can take to reduce both fear and 
risk of terrorism victimization.  The most important of these steps is to educate 
American citizens about the reality of terrorism victimization. 
 Between 2002 and 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) used a five 
level, color-coded scale of terrorism threat levels to attempt to help educate citizens 
about their risk of terrorism.  After almost a decade, DHS realized the system was not 
meeting the goal of providing citizens a realistic assessment of their terror risk (in 
virtually all circumstances, the national threat level was yellow (elevated, significant 
risk of terrorist attack) and replaced that system with the National Terrorism Advisory 
System (available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1303296515462.shtm).  
 Because these levels remained relatively unchanged between 2002 and 2011, 
most citizens ignored them because they felt they were meaningless or there was little 
they could do in their daily lives to increase or decrease their chances of terrorism 
victimization. While this is probably true to some extent (and probably more for 
terrorism than more traditional crimes), this is certainly not always the case. 
 To combat this problem, local emergency management and criminal justice 
agencies should provide more detailed information to the residents of their 
community regarding the threat levels of terrorism in that community.  Because the 
evidence presented here suggests that individuals are more fearful of terrorism as the 
population at risk increases, then having good, current information about the 
terrorism threat level in their own community will make individuals feel safer from 
terrorist activity in their homes and communities where the vast majority of their 
activities take place.  While we do not know for certain in every community and 
every situation, intuitively, a resident of a rural Kentucky community with no 
strategic governmental assets is probably at far less risk of terrorist activity than a 
Kentucky resident living near a strategic governmental asset.  This knowledge should 
make residents in those communities realize that they are at less risk of terrorism 
victimization and thus less fearful of terrorism in general.  Until such a strategy is 
considered and implemented, fear of terrorism is likely to present a threat for all.  
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